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Normative decision theories stipulate that rational economic decisions (in-
cluding investment decisions) are made based on the assessment of the ex-
pected outcomes. Accordingly, if available feedback information about an
investment project indicates at any given point in time that the expected out-
come would be negative, one would expect that such an investment project
would be immediately terminated. This implies that any prior funds spent
on an investment project that cannot be recovered (known as sunk costs) are
considered irrelevant to the decision to terminate. However, the decision-
making literature provides instances of entrapment or escalation where deci-
sion makers were influenced by sunk costs in their decisions. The psychology
literature provides two basic explanations for this entrapment or escalation
behavior. The first explanation attributes the escalation behavior to the
notion of self-justification and asserts that a decision-maker who is asso-
ciated with the initial decision to invest in a project will elect to commit
additional resources to the investment project as a way to justify past deci-
sions, even when the available information indicates that the project should
be terminated. The second explanation is rooted in prospect theory, which
postulates that decision-makers tend to evaluate choices as gains and losses
in relation to a neutral reference point and that decision-makers are gen-
erally risk seeking when faced with possible losses. That is, a risk-seeking
person would reject a certain loss in favor of a gamble with equal or even
“lower” expected value. Thus, for commitment escalation, the theory asserts
that decision makers would view sunk costs as a sure loss and they would
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prefer to engage in the escalation of prior commitments with the possibility
of incurring greater losses or recovering past investments. Agency theory
provides a third explanation for escalation of commitments. When a man-
ager posses private information on the state of the project, abandoning a
potentially failing project would reveal this state and adversely affect the
manager’s reputation while further commitment of resources protects the
manager’s reputation. This paper extends previous work on the escalation
of commitment by considering the effects of two additional variables that
usually constrain managers’ decisions. These variables are managers’ po-
tential liability for committing additional resources to a potentially failing
project, and the level of credibility of a project’s prospective information
that the manager obtains. A between-subject experimental design is used
where the three research variables (managers’ responsibility, potential lia-
bility, and credibility of information about the prospects of a hypothetical
project) are factorially crossed to obtain eight sets of experimental condi-
tions (a 2x2x2 ANOVA design) The results indicate significant main effects
of initial responsibility, potential liability, and information credibility. In
addition, there were significant two-way interaction effects between initial
responsibility and potential liability and information credibility.
keywords: Factorial Design, Normative Decision Theory, ANOVA, Poten-
tial Liability, and Information Credibility.
1 Introduction
Managers’ escalation of commitment to potentially failing projects has attracted atten-
tion in past years. For example, the Taurus project at the London Stock Exchange
involved about 600 million of investment before it was cancelled. Likewise, Daiwa Bank
of New York incurred about 1 billion in cumulative currency trading losses over a few
years before their strategy was abandoned.
Normative decision theories stipulate that rational economic decisions (including in-
vestment decisions) are made based on the assessment of the expected outcomes. Re-
views of investment projects usually proceed in the same manner. If at any given point
in time available information indicates that the project is no longer worth of contin-
uation (e.g., net present value of its future cash flows is negative), one would expect
the manager to immediately terminate it. This implies that any prior investment funds
that cannot be recovered (known as sunk costs) are irrelevant to the decision to termi-
nate. However, the decision-making literature provides instances of entrapment where
decision-makers were influenced by sunk costs in their decisions (Staw, 1976; Staw, 1981;
Staw and Ross, 1978; Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Brockner et al., 1984; Whyte, 1986; Gar-
land and Newport, 1991; Harrison and Harrell, 1995). Thus, there is an inconsistency
between the normative models of decision theory and management actual decision be-
haviour. This inconsistency has been used to either discredit the normative decision
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models or as evidence of entrapment and “irrational” behaviour.
Over the years, researchers have attempted to find an answer to the question of what
causes managers to escalate their commitments to failing projects. The psychology
literature provides two possible explanations for this entrapment or escalation behaviour.
The first explanation attributes the escalation behaviour to the notion of self-justification
and asserts that a decision-maker who is associated with the initial decision to invest in
a project will elect to commit additional resources to the investment project as a way to
justify past decisions, even when available information indicates that the project should
be terminated. Although this explanation emphasises the responsibility of the decision
maker regardless of the amount of the sunk cost involved, Garland and Newport (1991)
noted that the decision to continue or discontinue an investment project may also depend
on the proportion of planned expenditures to the original sunk costs. The theoretical
work of Shoemaker (1987) and Hogarth and Einhorn (1988) also indicate that decision
makers may be fixated on the size of a decision outcome or its probability and not the
expected value.
The second explanation is rooted in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
which has been suggested as a sound theoretical foundation to understand commitment
escalation (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Whyte, 1986). Prospect theory postulates that
decision makers tend to evaluate choices as gains and losses in relation to a neutral
reference point and that decision makers are generally risk- seeking when faced with
possible losses. That is, a risk-seeking person would reject a certain loss in favour of a
gamble with equal or even lower expected value. Thus, for commitment escalation, the
theory asserts that decision makers would view sunk costs as a sure loss and they would
prefer to engage in the escalation of prior commitments with the possibility of incurring
greater losses or recovering past investments.
Brockner (1992) pointed out that escalation of commitment appears to be the result of
numerous factors and processes and recommended that future research seek competing
explanations. This study extends previous work on escalation of commitment by consid-
ering the effects of two additional variables that usually constrain managers decisions:
(1) managers’ potential liability for committing additional resources to a potentially
failing project, and (2) the level of credibility of a project’s prospective information.
The inclusion of these variables in the experimental design would approximate a real-life
situation and enhance the level of realism in the experiment.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews relevant prior studies. The
second section deals with the research method and data collection. The third section
provides the results. The final section presents summary and conclusion.
2 Literature Review
Prior research on escalation of commitment addressed the underlying factors of such a
phenomenon by focusing on different possible explanations. Early stream of research
used the psychological notion of self-justification or personal responsibility to explain
escalation of commitments (e.g. Staw, 1981). This explanation posits that individuals
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use their prior association with a project to justify further commitment to such projects
even in the face of potential project failure. Individuals become more committed to af-
firm that their past decisions were correct. The results of Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982)
and Whyte (1993), among others, indicate that personal responsibility is positively as-
sociated with escalation of commitments. However, Brockner and Rubin (2012) indicate
that personal responsibility appears to have several other dimensions those prior studies
did not address (e.g., loss of reputation, denial of promotion or bonuses). Consistent with
this line of thought, Brockner (1992) indicate that the findings that personal responsi-
bility increases escalation of commitment could be subject to alternative explanations
as many factors contribute to such escalation behaviour. A second stream of research
on escalation of commitments used prospect theory. In prospect theory, each decision is
made after information has been filtered through a decision maker’s “decision frame” or
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This line of research focuses on how framing of infor-
mation affects the escalation behaviour. Whyte (1986; 1993) indicates that escalation of
commitment is the natural choice of negatively framed decisions. A third line of research
on escalation of commitment used agency theory framework (e.g., Harrison and Harrell,
1995; Harrell and Harrison, 1994; Chow et al., 1997). Agency theory postulates that
managerial and ownership interests can diverge in the face of adverse selection. There-
fore, managers are likely to make decisions that maximize their personal utility and not
that of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For such a divergence to take place in
connection with escalation of commitments, the following two conditions are necessary
(known as adverse selection):
1. The manager has more information than the firm owner. This is known as the
condition of information asymmetry.
2. The manager’s reward to escalate commitment to a project is greater than that of
terminating the project. This is known as the condition of incentive to shirk.
Kanodia et al. (1989) developed an analytical model indicating that a rational manager
would escalate commitment to a project if its abandonment adversely affects his/her
reputation as a competent manager, and that the manager possess private information
regarding the state of the project. Abandonment of a potentially failing project would
reveal this state while escalating it by further commitment of resources protects the
manager’s reputation. The results of Harrison and Harrell (1993), Harrell and Harrison
(1994) and Chow et al. (1997) provide empirical support for the agency theory model.
3 Development of the Research Hypotheses
This study posited three hypotheses. The first deals with the effect of the manager’s
potential personal liability on the project evaluation decision. It is hypothesized that
managers who assess a low level of potential personal liability for a failing project are
likely to engage in escalation behavior by committing additional resources than managers
who assess potential personal liability at higher levels. This hypothesis is supported by
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the economic notion of utility maximization as well as agency theory where managers will
avoid solutions that reduce their own wealth (in the form of higher potential liability).
The hypothesis is stated in the null form as follows:
H01. The mean score of escalation for subjects who assess higher levels of personal
liability is not significantly different from that of subjects who assess lower levels
of personal liability. The second hypothesis deals with the effect of information
reliability on the decision to engage in escalation behavior. It is hypothesized that
managers receiving reliable information about the potential failure of a project
are less likely to commit additional resources to such projects. It is assumed
that reliable information is available to the market while less reliable information
(although relevant) is not completely known to the market. As indicated earlier,
Managers will attempt to maintain their reputation and maximize their own wealth
by avoiding potentially failing projects where abandoning the project is the rational
behavior based on available reliable information. This hypothesis is stated in the
null form as follows:
H02. The mean score of escalation for subjects who receive highly reliable information
is not significantly different from that of subjects receiving less reliable informa-
tion. The third research hypothesis deals with the effect of initial responsibility.
As indicated earlier, prior research has posited that managers responsible for the
initiation of the project are likely to escalate their commitments than those who
did not initiate the project. This research is stated in the null form as follows.
H03. The mean score of escalation for subjects who initiated the project is not signifi-
cantly different from that of subjects who did not initiate the project. The above
research hypotheses are testing using t-tests and analysis of variance techniques.
4 Research Method
4.1 Research Design
This research adopts a between-subject experimental design. The three research vari-
ables (managers responsibility to initiate a project, potential liability of managers for
committing additional resources to a potentially failing project, and credibility of avail-
able information on the project) are factorial crossed to obtain eight sets of experimen-
tal conditions (a 2x2x2 ANOVA design). The choice of a between-subject design over
a within-subject design is mainly motivated by the desire to avoid the demand effects
associated with within-subjects designs.
4.2 Subjects
The author contacted an initial sample of 275 managers of companies located in Hong
Kong and North America for possible participation in the study. A total of 102 managers
agreed to participate in the study (45 from Hong Kong and 57 from North America).
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Subjects’ age across the sample ranged from 28 to 46 with an average of 35.5 years.
About 68 per cent of the sample was male and 32 per cent was female. Six subjects
were eliminated from the analysis to equalize cells. Thus the final sample was reduced
to 96 subjects. One can question the sufficiency of the sample for the experimental task.
With large sample size (e.g., a sample of 30 for each experimental group) would enable
the researcher to get better results and study the differences among the experimental
groups. Alternatively, one can pool all the data and have analysis of variance for the
main variables and their interactions. This is the approach that the author follows in
this paper.
4.3 Experimental Task
The study used a capital budgeting project, which is summarized in the appendix, as
the decision setting. The experimental materials were pilot-tested before conducting the
experiment using a large number of managers in both locations. Data from pilot-testing
were not included in the data analysis. Subjects were provided with background infor-
mation on the nature of the project, its product and market conditions. They were also
told about the company’s policy to accept projects that meet or exceed an established
targeted rate of return. The project under consideration did meet the company’s criteria
and has been under construction for the past two years. Subjects were also told that
existing company’s policies require each manager to review projects underway at the
end of its second year. The experimental instrument provided additional information on
amounts already spent on the project and the additional resources needed to continue
with the project. Subjects were further provided with additional information on assessed
cash flows after taxes before engaging in the project and at the time of the project’s re-
view. Each of the three research variables was presented to the subjects in one of two
forms. For the initial responsibility variable, one version of the instrument informed
the subjects that they initiated the project while the other version of the instrument
informed the subjects that a former manager initiated the project. The second research
variable (personal liability) was used as a dichotomous variable (high liability or low
liability), where one version of the instrument conveyed to the subject the existence of
high level of personal liability while the other version conveyed a lower level of personal
liability. The third research variable (information credibility) was also used as a di-
chotomous variable (low credibility or high credibility) in a fashion similar to that of the
second research variable Subjects were also provided with additional information on the
re-assessed cash flows after taxes at the time of the review where two possible scenarios
were provided. The data of the best possible scenario provided the basis to support the
continuation of the project where the re-assessed net present value of the project was
still positive although at a lower level than the original analysis. The worst-case scenario
provided subjects with the basis to support the decision to abandon the project where
the re-assessed net present value of continuation was negative (the appendix contains
one version of the instrument). Subjects were asked to assess the likelihood of commit-
ting the additional resources to the project in its third year based on the information
provided on a scale ranging from zero (definitely not) to 100 (definitely yes). This rating
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score is used as the measure of the dependent variable, which represents the manager’s
commitment to escalation.
5 Results
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the dependent variable for both sub-samples. The
table shows that the average estimate of escalation of commitment among the North
American subjects is lower than that of the Hong Kong subjects (0.332 as compared to
0.348). However, this difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.340, p = 0.734).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable
Sub-sample Mean Standard Deviation Range
North American Sample 0.332 0.223 0.0 - 0.90
Hong Kong Sample 0.348 0.235 0.0 - 0.85
Difference 0.016
The following two graphs present the mean plots of the two groups (North American
Sample and Hong Kong Sample).
Figure 1: Plots of Means of North American Sample (n=57)
Figure 2: Plots of Means of Hong Kong Sample (n=45)
The graphs show almost similar distribution between the two samples. However, one
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can notice that subjects of Moth American sample may seem to be more conservative in
their estimates of probabilities than those of Hong Kong. Because of the relatively small
sample size for each of the eight experimental group, the author looked at the results of
the pooled sample to identify the effects of the three variables and their interactions on
the decision to escalate commitment to a capital budgeting project. With large sample
size, one can look at the analysis of variance by groups between and within each sample.
Table 2 presents the analysis of variance results of the pooled sample. The table shows
statically significant main effects for each of the three variables (p < 0.0001). This
indicates that each of the three variables by itself has an effect on subjects’ decisions to
escalate their commitment to the project. These results would fail to reject all of the
hypothesized relationships.
Table 2: Analysis of Variance
Source Sum-of-squares df Mean-Square F-ratio p
Responsibility 0.970 1 0.970 33.882 0.000
Liability 0.381 1 0.381 13.318 0.000
Information 0.675 1 0.675 23.578 0.000
Interaction 1 0.216 1 0.216 7.533 0.007
Interaction 2 0.131 1 0.131 4.585 0.035
Interaction 3 0.016 1 0.016 0.569 0.453
Interaction 4 0.002 1 0.002 0.074 0.787
Error 2.519 88 0.029
1. Responsibility x liability.
2. Responsibility x information.
3. Liability x information.
4. Responsibility x liability x information.
The significant results for the three main variables indicate that subjects are aware of
the role of a manager’s responsibility when making a capital budgeting decision. Thus, if
this responsibility is not discharged according to existing information, legal actions could
be brought against such a manager. Table 2 also shows some significant interaction ef-
fects. The interaction of responsibility and liability is significant at the conventional
levels (F = 7.533, p < 0.007). Also the interaction of responsibility and information
is significant at the conventional levels (F = 4.585, p < 0.035). These interaction ef-
fects seem to be in line with the agency theory interpretation. The manager assesses
potential personal liability and the degree of liability of available information on the
potential failure of the project and makes the decision that maximises his/her interest
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given the initial responsibility for the project. Absence of significant three way interac-
tion effects (F = 0.074, p < 0.787) indicates that the decision to escalate is not affected
by the three variables together. It seems that managers consider their responsibility in
light of possible legal action (perhaps according to particular existing laws) or in light
of available credible information from experts in the area. Existences of liability and
credible information have the same effect on managers’ behaviour to escalate. Absence
of significant three way interaction indicate that one of the two variables) information or
liability) mitigates the effect of responsibility or contains its effect a redundant variable.
6 Implications and limitations
One can point to two main implications for the results of this paper. The first has to
do with the inclusion of management responsibility for failed projects when available
information indicates that the project should be abundant. The commercial law or
a similar legislation should incorporate the extent to which managers should be held
responsible. The second major implication deals with forming project audit committee.
Such committees should include managers who initiated the project. The paper is also
subject to some limitations. The first one deals with the extent to which the experimental
case materials have captured the real-world situation. By subjecting the experimental
case materials to pilot testing for clarity and realize with a sample of 25 managers from
both locations, the author believes that the effect of this limitation is minimized. A
second limitation deals with the effect of sample selection. Absence of a population
frame to select a random sample has forced the author to select a convenient sample.
However, the author believes that the random assignment of the case materials to the
sample members mitigates the effect of this limitation. A third limitation deals with
the possibility of other social and cultural factors that may affect the escalation of
commitments to a capital budgeting project (e.g., national pride, public relations).
7 Summary and Conclusions
Normative decision theories stipulate that rational economic decisions (including invest-
ment decisions) are made based on the assessment of the expected outcomes. Accord-
ingly, if available feedback information about an investment project indicates at any given
point in time that the expected outcome would be negative, one would expect that such
an investment project would be immediately terminated. This implies that any prior
funds spent on an investment project that cannot be recovered (known as sunk costs)
are considered irrelevant to the decision to terminate. However, the decision-making
literature provides instances of entrapment or escalation where decision-makers were in-
fluenced by sunk costs in their decisions. The psychology literature provides two basic
explanations for this entrapment or escalation behavior. The first explanation attributes
escalation behavior to the notion of self-justification. It asserts that a decision maker
who is associated with the initial decision to invest in a project will elect to commit
additional resources to the investment project as a way to justify past decisions, even
Electronic Journal of Applied Statistical Analysis 549
when the available information indicates that the project should be terminated. The
second explanation is rooted in prospect theory, which postulates that decision makers
tend to evaluate choices as gains and losses in relation to a neutral reference point and
that decision-makers are generally risk seeking when faced with possible losses. That is,
a risk-seeking person would reject a certain loss in favor of a gamble with equal or even
lower expected value. Thus, for commitment escalation, the theory asserts that decision
makers would view sunk costs as a sure loss and they would prefer to engage in the esca-
lation of prior commitments with the possibility of incurring greater losses or recovering
past investments. Agency theory provides a third explanation for escalation of com-
mitments. When a manager possesses private information on the state of the project,
abandoning a potentially failing project would reveal this state and adversely affect
the manager’s reputation while further commitment of resources protects the manager’s
reputation. This paper extends previous work on the escalation of commitment by con-
sidering the effects of two additional variables that usually constrain managers’ decisions.
These variables are managers’ potential liability for committing additional resources to
a potentially failing project, and the level of credibility of a project’s prospective infor-
mation that the manager obtains. A between-subject experimental design is used where
the three research variables (managers’ responsibility, potential liability, and credibility
of information about the prospects of the project) are factorially crossed to obtain eight
sets of experimental conditions (a 2x2x2 ANOVA design) The results indicate significant
main effects of initial responsibility, potential liability, and information credibility. In
addition, there were significant two-way interaction effects between initial responsibility
and potential liability and information credibility Future research may include social and
cultural factors in the study of escalation of commitment. Also a group comparison (as-
signed eight groups) may reveal some additional information that help in understanding
escalation of commitment.
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